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Civil Liberties--
Acid Test of Democracy
In this Comment, Professor Freeman makes a
period survey of the United States Supreme Court
decisions dealing with civil liberties. He con-
cludes with an analysis of the Court's present
treatment of these questions, and sets forth sug-
gestions for future Court policy.
Harrop A. Freeman*
THE large number of law review articles on civil liberties
might seem to suggest that a general article thereon is not now
needed. Yet one searches the list in vain for a recent broad theoreti-
cal or jurisprudential justification for civil liberties in the United
States and a plan for future development based on such jurispru-
dence. I have purposely used the term "liberties" rather than "rights,"
so often employed in such discussions, out of deference to the careful
use of language in jurisprudential thought' and because it more
closely reflects the relationship between civil liberties and a liberal
democracy. I
Every civilization finds its justification in certain assumptions and
preconceptions, relating to the nature of man and the good life for
which he seeks. As Professor George Sabine has so aptly said: "At
some point a nation confronts its final conviction about what it is
possible for human life to be and what they desire that it should
-become, and upon that choice they build their civilization and so
they make their place in history. On that conviction it has to stake
its life and fortune."2 Every constitution or political order is an
attempt to formulate the underlying assumptions, the philosophy of
government and the theory of interests to be protected, which are
basic to that particular civilization, and to so crystallize and elevate
them as to put them beyond the reach of hysteria and temporary
-majorities or power groups. Invariably the document is not merely a
recording of accepted practices and tested values, but also a vision
-of aspirations and the hoped for heavenly city. The constitution
must not be a dragging anchor gripping tenaciously to the past, but
* Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Law
1. Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLuTm. L. RLv. 1129 (1956).
.2. SA.Bn, DmiocmAcy A PREcOCEIVED IDEAs (1945).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a keel for stability and a chart for voyage. We should therefore
recognize that: (1) no constitution is self-executing; it must be inter-
preted and applied to many and ever changing concrete problems.
(2) Interpretation involves a backward look to determine antece-
dents and historical guidance and a forward look to conform these
to ongoing demands. (3) The courts, and the citizens and their rep-
resentatives, form different facets, but are part of the same process.
Experimentation in applying and protecting basic assumptions and
values lies in the people and their chosen legislators. (4) The courts'
job is to judge the continuity of present acts with the original and
developing constitution. It has the advantage of second guessing
and is in a position to take the 'long view" in restraint of hysteria
and temporary demands. 3 I shall later consider the trend of Supreme
Court cases in order to evaluate the degree to which the Court has
performed its functions vis-a-vis civil liberties and liberal democracy.
What was the original American faith and what was its relation-
ship with civil liberties? It is generally recognized that the constitu-
tional embodiment of civil liberties cast the die for America as a
liberal democracy, liberalism being properly defined not solely by
ends but also by means, not by a set of beliefs and dogmas but in
terms of an attitude toward beliefs and their formation and re-
formation. As recently stated by one author:
It may be suggested that liberalism relates not to what one believes, but to
what one believes about what one believes -or, to put it differently, to
one's attitude toward his own and other people's convictions. In this sense,
liberalism implies relativism and tolerance, a willingness to concede that
one has not arrived at the whole truth, an operative awareness of the
possibility that one may yet have something to learn, that opposing points
of view may be valid, that diversity of opinion is legitimate and indeed
useful.4
3. See CoawiN, TnE DocrRui OF JUDIcAL REviEw, Ivs LEGAL AND HISTOUCAL
BASES (1914); HoLmS, COLLEarE LEGAL PAPERS (1920); THE FEDmtAsT No. 78
(Hamilton); WARREN, CONGRESS, Tm CoNsmnurmoN, AND THm SuPREmE COUNT
(1935); Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Mici. L.
REv. 247 (1914); Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review (pts. 1 & 2), 9
MIcH. L. REv. 102, 283 (1910-1911); Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court in a
Modern World, 5 VAND. L. REv. 427 (1951); Finkelstein, Further Notes on judicial
Self-Limitation, 39 HARv. L. REv. 221 (1925); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation,
37 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1924); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. 1Ev. 1362 (1953); Machen,
The Elasticity of the Constitution (pt. 2), 14 H~nv. L. 1REv. 273 (1900); Roberts,
Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949);
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAuv. L. Rv. 193 (1952);
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893); Tweed, Provisions of the Constitution Concerning the
Supreme Court of the United States, 31 B.U.L. R1Ev. 1 (1951); White, New Theories
of Constitutional Construction, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 238 (1944).
4. Claude, Toward a Definition of Liberalism, 17 Hu-mAmsTr 259, 260 (1957).
512 [Vol. 43:511
CIVIL LIBERTIES
The American faith and assumptions have been recorded, again
and again, by students of liberal democracy-men like George
Sabine and Morris Cohen, and by Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Bran-
deis, Douglas, Jackson, Frankfurter and others. Our forefathers
assumed (1) a right of independence and self-determination epito-
mized in the ballot; (2) a right of redress exemplified in the Revolu-
tion; (3) a respect for the rule of law, embodied in court supremacy;
(4) a fear of concentrated government power and militarism; (5) a
belief in reasonableness of human nature, with its underlying faith
in the value of tolerance and the inevitability of progress; an (6) a
glorification of freedom and individualism carried even to the ex-
treme of isolation. As Morris Cohen has said:
I would suggest that liberalism means a pride in human achievement, a
faith in human effort, a conviction that the proper function of governments
is to remove the restraints upon human activity. The philosophy back of
that is summed up in two great faiths or beliefs: the belief in progress,
and the belief in toleration.5
What then of other nations and other political philosophies? Cer-
tain other nations today refer to themselves as "democratic" and
point to the ends which serve the demos or people. They seek the
classless state, improved economic, educational and health condi-
tions. In this concept of thepurpose of government, the avowed end of
serving the people is to be accomplished by a tight-knit, monolithic
political dogma and party which foregoes civil liberties and liberal-
ism in the hope of a more speedy transition to the end sought. A
typical title for a Communist tract advocating this view is Spender's
Forward from Liberalism.
At mid-twentieth century the issue is joined before world opinion
between the totalitarian politic and democracy. Ultimately the his-
tory of this century will be told, not in terms of relative scientific
development, nor even in success in war, but in the degree to which
our kind of democracy flfills itself.
What we seem to be saying is that in the Bill of Rights, and par-
ticularly the first amendment to the Constitution, is embodied the
theory of liberty which is the underlying presupposition of American
democracy, and that a study of our faithfulness to the intent of that
amendment will measure the effectiveness of our democracy. The
first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the ri ht of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.0
5. Comm, The Future of American Liberalism, in THE FArm or A LmmuL
439 (1946).
6. U.S. CONST. art L
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Perhaps we should expand these words considerably and remind
ourselves of the theory, wisdom and experience that lies behind
these provisions:
Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civilization. .... 7
The basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can
rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas
will result in the wisest governmental policies.8
hence:
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the high service
it has given our society ...
Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith.
We have founded our political system on it. It has been the safeguard
of every religious, political, philosophical, economic, and racial group
amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is
cheap and false; we have trusted the common sense of our people to
choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. This has been
the one single outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol
of freedom and equality. We have deemed it more costly to liberty to
suppress a despised minority than to let them vent their spleen. We have
above all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land where
our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures of the
world.9
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on
free discussion. . . . [Ilt is only through free debate and free exchange
of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and
peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote
diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions
that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. 10
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. . . . As first and moderate methods to
attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to
an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity be-
comes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.
• . . Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson
of every such effort ...
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these begin-
nings."
7. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
8. Id. at 503 (opinion of Vinson, C.J.).
9. Id. at 584-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He continues: "The First Amendment
makes confidence in the common sense of our people and in their maturity of judg-
ment the great postulate of our democracy." Id. at 590.
10. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
11. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943)
(opinion of Jackson, J.). See also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937):
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
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Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconce tions and have pro-
found unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.12
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas -that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.' 3
The high place in which the right to speak, think, and assemble as you
will was held by the Framers of the Bill of Rights and is held today by
those who value liberty both as a means and an end indicates the solicitude
with which we must view any assertion of personal freedoms. We must
recognize, moreover, that regulation of 'conduct' has all too frequently
been employed by public authority as a cloak to hide censorship of unpop-
ular ideas.14
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They be-
lieved that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemi-
nation of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government . . .
Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase
the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by
peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very founda-
tion of constitutional government.
12. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). For the premises:
For social development of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity
for the free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite. The
history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error
which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have ielded
to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not
to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of
thought soon shrivels without freedom of expression. Nor can truth be
pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the endeavor or under dangers which
are hazarded only by heroes.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
13. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 895, 396 (1950)
(opinion of Vinson, C.J.).




enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability.
Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases
it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy
of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for deny-
ing free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The
wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation
and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in
mind .... 15
This freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is tho
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.' 6
Those paragraphs were composites, taken from seven Supreme
Court opinions, majority and dissenting, over the past thirty years
and with some parts of which every judge on the Court during that
period agreed.
If this be the ideal, what has been the effect of the stresses and
strains of the Twentieth Century, and how has the Supreme Court
met those stresses and strains? We have said previously, and the
Supreme Court has pointed out on occasion, that the Constitution
is not "a piece of outworn parchment" fitted only to "horse and
buggy conditions," 17 but is an organic living instrument- "words
that have called into being a nation with a past to be preserved for
the future." '8 Lawyers are all fully aware, as Mr. Justice Hughes
remarked, that this makes the constitution what the judges say it is."8
Always mindful that its power rests upon the fragile basis of popular
respect,20 the Court has maintained constitutional resiliency by filter-
ing contemporary trends down to its professional hardpan of consti-
tutional values. At times the Justices have dammed back a wave of
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
(Footnotes omitted.)
16. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(opinion of Jackson, J.).
17. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
18. KAurxa, New Wine in Old Bottles, in FaoNTnn s OF CONSTITUTIONAL LuMJTY
1 passim (1956).
19. AnDR.ssEs OF CHAniLus EVANS HUarzs 185 (2d ed. 1916).
20. There is not mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the
nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of the
governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity
to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion,
not public opinion by authority.




social economics;1 at others they supplied the catalyst for racial
integration.2 Many and well known have been the tools by which
the judge shapes this evolutionary process. Stare decisis may be
insisted on, or it may be disregarded as when a very old doctrine is
dramatically scuttled as Swift v. Tyson23 falls before Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins24 or decisions little more than a year old are reversed in
the flag salute2- and the Jehovah's Witness20 cases. So the doctrine
of clear and present danger is only a tool And so also is the newer
concept of evaluating competing interests, the presumptions of valid-
ity or invalidity of legislation, the designation of certain rights as
preferred, the fixing of procedural requirements by which to raise
constitutional questions, the use of statutory construction to escape
constitutional questions, the respect for legislative policy and the
rule of judicial self-restraint- all these are only tools at the service
of an underlying philosophy.7
What, then, are some of the stresses and strains of the present
century to which this flexibility has had to fit the constitution? We
must recall that the entire history of interpreting the first amend-
ment, and embodying its protections in the fourteenth amendment,
developed only in the last forty years, since the First World War.2
Any review of the attacks on first amendment liberties and the cases
hammering out, blow by blow, their meaning is a catalogue of the
movements and crises of our century. Let us list a few of the major
recognizable factors, and I mention only five:
(1) Almost constant war, revolution and cold war, with demands
for national unity, conscription, military predominance, the govern-
ment as propagandist and the concept that the highest interest in
society is military self-preservation.
(2) The thrust of America into a position of world leadership,
with loss of isolation, a control by money or otherwise of subordinate
21. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918); see KurEz, CoNs noNxAL Lw, CASEs AND MAT=As ch.
10 (1954).
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 483 (1954) and similar cases.
23. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. Minersvile School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), ocerruled by West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), petition for rehearing granted, 318
U.S. 796 (1943), reo'd per curiam, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
27. Any good constitutional law textbook or casebook will illustrate how these
rules have been employed as the reasoning process for judges to arrive at desired
decisions. See Frankfurter, J. in Dennis v. United States, 841 U.S. 494, 517--61
(1951) (concurring), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (19-19) (concur-
ring), critical of the -clear and present danger" thesis. And see Ko.,wrrz, FuN-DA-
IMrNTAL LBMTEIES OF A FrE PEoPLE cit 27 (1957), critical of Justice Frankfurter's
deference to the legislature.
28. TBnsoLrn' AmnacAN CoNsm-rrmoNAxL LAw 346-56 (1959).
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nations and the acquisition of a righteousness complex which easily
phrases conflicting interests into an Armageddon between good and
evil.
(3) The growth of both corporate and governmental power, with
the nation rather than state predominating and an expanding police
power. A complex economy dependent on government spending.
(4) Changing forms of government all over the world; constitu-
tions which class other interests higher than liberties; the shift of
emphasis from freedom to security; and the emergence of adminis-
trative law and legislative watchdog committees as the newest gov-
ernmental procedure.
(5) At the same time a fresh stirring of the humanitarian "spirit"
of man, with recognition that poverty, hunger and war are unneces-
sary. Expanding suffrage, the rise of colored peoples, mass media of
communication, unlimited horizons in science and education, an
observation of the fruits of totalitarianism of the left and right, new
religious interests and activity.29
The above is not a random catalogue. Each explains to some
degree what has been happening in Supreme Court decisions on civil
liberties. Thus the increased centralization of government is reflected
in the adequacy of protection afforded civil liberties against state
action and the inadequacy of protection against the federal govern-
ment. Not once in our 175 years of history has the Supreme Court
yet protected a first amendment freedom against the national legis-
lature.30 The obsession with war and security has accounted for the
whole line of repression from Schenck v. United States,3" which
drove open advocacy of opposition to government underground to
emerge in its more dangerous conspiratorial nature in the 1951
Dennis v. United States.2 The rise of the Negro and America's bid
for world following is reflected in the Brown v. Board of Education '3
case upsetting the old Plessy v. Ferguson84 "separate but equal"
doctrine of segregation. The vigor of the new religious sects, particu-
larly the Jehovah's Witnesses and the desire for religious instruction
have developed the large body of law on separation of church and
State and on the free pulpit.
29. Other authors have made similar lists of challenges to liberal democracy. See
COHEN, op. cit. supra note 5, passim.
30. COMMAGER, MAJoITY RuLE AND MnomruY RIcrrs (1943); KONVTZ, FUNDA-
mENTAL. LiBERTiES OF A FREE PEOPLE 295 (1957). This is true, though some consider
the following cases mild protection: Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Lovett, 828 U.S. 303 (1946);
Ballard v. United States, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), conviction aff'd, 152 F.2d 941 (9th
Cir. 1945), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
31. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
32. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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It may be desirable to briefly examine the stages through which
the Supreme Court decisions as to civil liberties have gone, though
I leave it to my readers to expand this thumbnail sketch.
Writers generally recognize four periods: (a) 1918-1925, the
Espionage cases of World War I and the phrasing of "clear and
present danger," (b) 1925-1940, protection of liberties against the
states, the developing due process concept of the fourteenth amend-
ment, (c) 1940-1950, the high tide of protection, the firstness of the
first amendment, (d) 1950 to ??, restricting the protections and the
absolutes, deference to the legislative will. I shall treat these four
periods and suggest wherein these trends should be changed,35 but
I wish to add two more. I will consider the pre-1918 era, and ulti-
mately to ask whether a new post-1957 stage can be recognized, and
if so, what suggestions have we to make toward shaping its direction.
Period 1: Pre-1918
Although the Supreme Court has said that no important case
involving free expression was decided prior to the 1918 Schenck
case, this is not wholly true. Nor are we wholly freed from the
errors of that earlier period. I mention only four cases: the
Slaughter-House Cases"" refusing to utilize the "privileges and im-
munities" clause of the fourteenth amendment to carry the first
amendment liberties as a protection against state action; Reynolds
v. United States,3r disallowing religious belief as a defense to the
federally stated crime of polygamy; Davis v. Massachusetts,s deny-
ing the streets and parks as places of free discussion; United States
v. Cruikshan,39 seeming to restrict the right of assembly to assem-
blies called for the purpose of petitioning for redress of grievances.
It is probable that the effect, if not the language, in the cases other
than the Reynolds case, has been overruled by Hague v. CIO,40
Delonge v. Oregon 41 and Palko v. Connecticut 42 defining the rights
of citizens and opening public places and assemblies to generally free
discussion. I would, nevertheless, urge that the Court abandon the
Slaughter-House rule and expressly make the privileges and immuni-
ties provisions of the fourteenth amendment of equal importance
35. One clear statement of the four periods is, Kauper, The Market Place of Ideas,
in FRoNES or CoNsTrrunoxAL LmERT 55, 60 (1956).
36. 83 U.S. (16 WaiL) 36 (1873). See the statement in Dennis o. Unitcd States,
that there was no important case prior to 1919. 341 U.S. at 503.
37. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
38. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
39. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
40. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
41. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
42. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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to the due process clause.43 And I would reverse or restrict the
Reynolds decision, for it has given rise to two tendencies contrary
to the American ideal- it has produced a definition of religion as
Christian belief in a Divine Being and it has implied that merely
making an act a crime places speech or religious practice advocating
the act beyond constitutional protection.4 * The Court must examine
every defense based on first amendment liberties; that someone has
made the act a crime does not foreclose analysis; only if the speech
or belief is a recognized exception to the intended liberty is it
beyond protection.
Period 1I: World War I and the Espionage Law, 1918-1925
Speaking about the World War I period, most writers focus their
attention on the formulation of the clear and present danger doc-
trine. But this misses the point, for that expression was developed
as a lawyer's method of relating speech to a prohibited act or statu-
tory construction, and of determining whether the evidence war-
ranted an application of the statute. In every instance it resulted in
convictions; not in protecting liberties. The Court has recently ana-
lyzed these old cases as follows: Schenck 45 went to jail for printing
15,000 pamphlets against conscription, the most inflamatory phrase
being, "You must uphold the rights of the people of this country."
Twelve editorials attacking the war convicted Frohwerk.4' Eugene
Debs, 47 whom Clarence Darrow deemed the most saintly man he
ever met, gave one speech on pacifism. Abrams 4 attacked the war
in two socialist circulars; Schaefer4 1 published German language
articles against capitalism and war. The clergyman's robe was no
defense to Pierce5" who made a religious attack on war and
America's entry and Professor Gilbert 5' found no academic freedom
to attack the war. Only once, and that because the government
admitted its error, was a conviction reversed, in United States v.
Baltzer.52 What was the crime there? Twenty-seven Dakota farmers
43. A good collection of the material critical of the trimming of tho "privileges
and immunities" clause is in KAuPER, CONsTTTONAL LAw CASES AND MATmEALLS
555-91 (1954); KoNvrrz, THE CONSTITUTIoN AND CVIL Ricirrs ch. 3 (1947).
See also Mr. Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436-50 (1935) (dis-
senting) and Hague v. CIO 307 U.S. 496, 518-32 (1939).
44. I have distinguished the case and developed the rule that should obtain in
Freeman, Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958).
45. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
47. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
48. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
49. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
50. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
51. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
52. 248 U.S. 593 (1918) (memorandum decision).
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had circulated a petition opposing the war and sent it to the legisla-
ture. I would place Gitlow v. New York,53 Fiske v. Kansas, 4 and
Whitney v. California55 cases of 1925-1927 in this pattern though
they foreshadow the next period.
Recently, in the Dennis 6 case, the Court recognized that the
Schenck, Whitney and Gitlow majority opinions were of question-
able validity since open discussion should be protected whereas
conspiracy in the Dennis case should not be protected. Is this a
belated recognition that what looks like danger in the hysteria of one
period looks safe by hindsight, that ghosts of the night fade in the
light of dawn? Can it be that the very suppression of free speech
for unpopular views in 1918 produced the underground conspiracy
that troubled us in 1950? 1 suggest that the Court make it clear that
the first amendment does protect free discussion of the type involved
in these early cases. The Court may have taken two small steps in
this direction in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,57 preempting the field of
subversion from the states to the federal realm, an in Yates v.
United States,58 drawing the line between conspiracy and incitement
to violence, compared to teaching and advocacy. But because the
gradation between overthrow, conspiracy, incitement, advocacy,
teaching and abstract examination or belief is slight and obscure, this
field will not be clear until the Court specifically states that it has
not, in Dennis and Yates, reverted to Schenck and Gitlow.
Period III: Protection against the States-the Fourteenth Amend-
ment
The next period is normally traced from the Gitlow case in 1925
and ends with the new Court in the fall term of 1939. During this
period the fourteenth amendment due process clause was made to
carry the first amendment liberties as protections against state
action. In Gitlow, the right of free speech was recognized but not
protected. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. OlsonG9 guaranteed the press
against pre-censorship. Delonge v. Oregon 0 insured the right, even
of communists, to peaceably assemble. Herndon v. Lowry06 struck
down a statute for vagueness in the words "attempt to incite insur-
53. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
54. 274 U.S. 880 (1927).
55. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
56. Dennis v. United States, 841 U.S. 494, 50-07, 588-44 (1951) (opinion of
Vinson, C.J., concurring).
57. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
58. 854 U.S. 298 (1957).
59. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
60. 299 U.S. 858 (1987).
61. 801 U.S. 242 (1987).
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rection." Lovell v. City of Grffin62 invalidated attempts to pre-
license the distribution of papers and handbills. And so the list might
continue.
We have already noted the reversal during the period of the pre-
1900 cases refusing to protect free assembly and use of public
places. And some movement was made away from the criminal
syndicalism cases in Stromberg v. California.0 3 But in Hamilton v.
Regents,64 for the first time, liberties were deemed unprotected
because the individual sought a "privilege"- attendance at a free
university which required ROTC training contrary to a man's
religion.
During this period, few clearly stated constitutional rules appear.
Statutes were declared invalid for indefiniteness; they were con-
sidered not to apply to the facts; they were construed to avoid
constitutional issues. When speech or action carried overtones of
violence, or when the paramount interest in war-making was
involved, the cases studiously avoid reference to the clear and
present danger test.
Period IV: 1940-1950
The period from 1940 to 1950 is often referred to as the high tide
of civil liberties protection. The Jehovah's Witnesses gained real
protection for religious freedom beginning with Cantwell v. Con-
necticut65 in 1940, and extending through more than thirty cases.
They were shielded in meetings, distributing literature and hand-
bills, using public places, ringing doorbells, attacking other religions,
playing victrola records, refusing to salute the flag, strongly opposing
the war. Only once, when a Jehovah's Witness parent claimed an
absolute right to control a child as against the state acting as
parens patriae, did the Court waiver in its protection in Prince v.
Massachusetts.66 In Falbo v. United States,6" Estep v. United
States,68 and similar cases, 0 the Court granted procedural protec-
tions to Jehovah-Witness objectors to war, undreamed of in World
War I.
Strangely, though this was a time of war, the Court never faced
the sedition and criminal syndicalism problems of 1918. Indications
62. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
63. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
64. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
65. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
66. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
67. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
68. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
69. See the culmination of these in Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389
(1953); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
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were that it would have reversed the earlier espionage holdings. For
in Girouard v. United States,70 and Cohnstaedt v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv.1 it reversed the previous United States v.
Schwimmer,72 United States v. Bland,3 and United States v. Macin-
tosh 74 cases denying citizenship to pacifists; Hartzel v. United
States,75 was decided contrary to the old Schenck case on almost
identical facts; Taylor v. Mississippi 76 refused to convict a man for
a much more vicious attack on the war than had placed Professor
Gilbert behind bars 25 years earlier. One of the few groups unpro-
tected were the Japanese-Americans on the West Coast."
Picketing was recognized as free speech in Thornhill v. Ala-
bana;78 the right of the press to comment on judicial trials was
carried to great lengths in Bridges v. California," Pennekamp v.
Florida80 and similar cases. There developed an almost inexorable
liberal march toward protecting any asserted liberty, until finally in
1949 with the Terminiello8l case, in which a rabble rouser inside an
auditorium hurled words of hate at Jews, while mobs churned
around the entrances and objects were thrown through the windows,
lawyers began to wonder what had happened to the old rule that
persons using libelous fighting words were not protected by the
first amendment
In protecting freedoms the majority developed a series of tests
which tended to be applied doctrinaire: that the first amendment
freedoms occupied a "preferred" position; therefore any legislation
challenged as interfering therewith could not be presumed constitu-
tional and might in fact carry the burden of justification; the "clear
and present danger" standard was no longer a rule of evidence but
an affirmative test which statutes must meet; invalidation for vague-
ness and indefiniteness was expanded so that government action was
tested as to its probable, as well as its actual, result12
Other members of the Court counselled caution, particularly
70. 828 U.S. 61 (1946).
71. 839 U.S. 901 (1950) (per curiam), reversing 167 Kan. 451, 207 P.2d 425
(1949).
72. 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
78. 283 U.S. 686 (1931).
74. 288 U.S. 605 (1931).
75. 822 U.S. 680 (1944).
76. 819 U.S. 583 (1948).
77. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Kirabayashi v. United
States, 820 U.S. 81 (1948); Freeman, Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus-Genalogy,
Evaluation and Law, 28 CoaNmr. L. Q. 414 (1948); Rostow, The Japanese Ameri-
can Cases-A Disaster, 54 YAxL L.J. 489 (1945).
78. 810 U.S. 88 (1940).
79. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
80. 828 U.S. 831 (1946).
81. Terminiello v. Chicago, 837 U.S. 1 (1949).
82. Ibid.; Thorahill v. Alabama, 810 U.S. 88 (1940).
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Justices Jackson and Frankfurter. They suggested that other interests
were being disregarded-e.g., privacy of the home in Martin v. City
of Struthers,3 integrity of the judicial process as against hostile
newspapers in Craig v. Harney 84 and the danger of mob violence in
Terminiello.85 If preferring liberties was to result in presumptions
of legislative invalidity, then there should be no preference, for the
legislature must ever be kept as a protector of liberties and its
judgment of public interest was important.
Period V: 1950-1957
The death of Justices Rutledge and Murphy in the summer of
1949 marked the beginning of a new trend, certainly lasting to 1957.
The broad generalities of the 1940 protections were brought up
against the hard realities of conflicting interests and were curtailed.
The cart6 blanche for "inciting" words in Terminiello was almost
immediately limited in Feiner v. New York, 0 upholding the convic-
tion of a Syracuse University student tending to incite a mob on a
street corner. Kovacs v. Cooper8" restricted the right previously
recognized in Saia v. New York88 to use sound trucks to those which
did not emit blaring and raucus sounds. The almost impenetrable
wall of separation of church and state in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ.89 was breached in Zorach v. Clauson.90 The right to
push doorbells granted Jehovah's Witnesses and religious groups in
the Opelika,91 Murdock92 and Struthers"' cases was denied to com-
mercial solicitors in Breard v. Alexandria-4 Group libel of Negroes,
Jews and others was removed from protection of free speech in
Beauharnais v. Illinois,95 over the objection of the very groups
libeled. Although the Court continued to assure newspapers the
right to comment on court trials, it raised some question in Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.9" and Shepherd v. Florida 07 whether
the British practice to allow no comment on current criminal cases
83. 319 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
84. 331 U.S. 367, 384-94, 394-97 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting; Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
85. 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
86. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
87. 836 U.S. 77 (1949).
88. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
89. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
90. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
91. 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd per curiam, 319 U.S. 796 (1943).
92. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
93. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
94. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
95. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
96. 338 U.S. 912, 920-36 (1950).
97. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
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was not better. In only two areas did the Court seem to expand
libertarian protection: it further condemned prior censorship or
restraint of religious meetings in Niemotko v. Maryland98 and Kunz
v. New York," and of sacrilegious or obscene material in Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson 100 and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents.'
And it showed a tendency to bar states from restricting free expres-
sion in areas already occupied by the federal government in the
Nelson case' 012 and in Carroll v. Allen B. DuMont Laboratories
In. 0 3
But it is not for these cases that the period is known. The 1950
period is marked almost exclusively by the campaign to combat
internal subversion during the cold war. In 1950, in American Com-
munications Assn v. Douds,04 the noncommunist affidavit require-
ment of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act was upheld. In
1951, in the Dennis o5 case, top communist leaders were convicted of
organizing a party which conspired and advocated the overthrow
of the government by force. In 1951 noncommunist oaths for public
employees were sanctioned in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works.""
In 1952, in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,0 7 communist aliens were
deported. The protection from being made to testify against oneself
was curtailed in Rogers v. United States 108 and similar cases. Even
when persons were protected against loyalty oath statutes and
loyalty board procedures in Wieman v. Updegraff'0 9 and Peters v.
Hobby,"° no mention of first amendment rights occurred. The pro-
tections were afforded by requiring compliance with statutory
procedures by finding an abuse of power.
In fact the Court's jurisprudence from 1950 to 1957 is marked by
four trends, which may broadly be referred to as the Frankfurter
approach: (1) the use of statutory interpretation rather than basic
constitutional arguments to protect rights; (2) the change of the
clear and present danger test from a fairly precise formula to a
reliance on weighing all competing interests; (3) a deference for
the legislature and the legislature's definition of the public interest;
(4) an insistence on fair procedures and avoidance of pre-censorship
98. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
99. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
100. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
101. 846 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953).
102. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 900 (1956).
103. 340 U.S. 929 (1951), denying cert. to 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
104. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
105. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
106. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
107. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
108. 340 U.S. 367 (1951); see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
109. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
110. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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in order that channels of redress may operate. Perhaps no one has
more thoroughly criticized the Frankfurter position than Professor
Milton Konvitz in his Fundamental Liberties of a Free People. I do
not agree with his treatment of the clear and present danger test as
a constitutional jewel, in his branding Mr. Justice Frankfurter's mind
as legislative rather than judicial, and in his seeming reliance on
absolutes without defining them. But in criticizing Justice Frank-
furter for too great deference to the legislative will, and failing to
see the importance of the first amendment liberties to the democratic
process, I agree.
Is There Then a Sixth or Current Period? I believe the answer is
distinctly, yes. It began in May and June of 1957. It is marked by
permitting former communists to qualify for the practice of law in
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners"' and Konigsberg v. State
Bar."2 It is typified by Mesarosh v. United States"3 overruling a
Smith Act conviction based on tainted evidence and the Jencks v.
United States" 4 decision requiring that in a prosecution for a false
noncommunist affidavit, the government could not use the testimony
of an FBI undercover agent without making available to the defend-
ant his FBI report. Watkins v. United States,"5 involving the House
Un-American Activities Committee, and a similar state case, Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,"6 protected the first amendment freedoms
against investigating committees, restricted investigations to legiti-
mate legislative functions and required that each question bear a
pertinency to the legitimate purpose. Most important, Yates v.
United States "I made it clear that the Dennis case did not condemn
mere advocacy and teaching -even teaching of communism. Only
conspiracy and incitement to violence were outside the protection of
the first amendment.
And in other related fields one senses a changed court attitude.
A very liberal approach has developed to prevent the use of obscen-
ity statutes to legislate an orthodoxy of morals in Butler v. Michi-
gan"8 and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown."9 But it is disappointing
to note that this high protection against state action is not reflected
when a federal anti-obscenity statute takes its toll, see Roth v. United
States." ' Deep concern for procedural due process appears with
111. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
112. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
113. 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
114. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
115. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
116. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
117. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
118. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
119. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
120. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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regard to discharge of government employees, 12 deportation, 1 '
wiretapping, 3 and state criminal1 24 or penal prosecutions.13 That
takes us down through the most recent cases.
I could, in discussing these 1957 and 1958 cases show you that I
think the Court has begun to meet the criticisms already aimed at
the 1950 cases, but I ask your leave to refer to these in discussing
my own concept of the direction in which we should move.
Of course, you have a right to ask me now, "What then would you
like the Supreme Court to do?" While the following suggestions are
only tentative, I offer them to you as my present thinking:
(1) I have already suggested that the Court should reverse the
Slaughter-House, Reynolds and criminal syndicalism cases, thus re-
establishing that the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment has teeth, that merely declaring an act criminal
does not change the problem of civil liberties protections, and that
open advocacy of views we abhor must be tolerated.Y0
(2) I strongly disapprove of the procedural hurdles which the
Court has erected to prevent the raising of constitutional questions.
Typical is Screws v. United States "2 and the requirement that a
person must have a "personal interest in order to bring suit. A
recent article12 demonstrates that once you label an individuals
interest as "personal" it becomes possible to view the government
as always speaking for the "public" interest, whereas in fact much
121. Service v. Dulles, 854 U.S. 862 (1957).
122. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
123. Lambert v. California, 855 U.S. 96 (1957).
124- Aleorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
125. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
126. It is generally recognized that the rejection of the argument, that the
fourteenth amendment "privileges and immunities" clause carried the protection of
the first amendment to all citizens as against the States in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1893), and Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), was an
attempt to aid in drawing the North and South together. See WAUxEN, SxmRnE
CounT iN UNrTED STATE-s Hrsoany 610 (1926). The same can be said for Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The reasons have changed. There has always been
an uneasy acceptance of the Slaughter-House decision: see dissent of Justices Bradley,
Field and Swayne and Chief Justice Chase; Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404, 445-47 (1935) (dissenting) and in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519-21
(1939). For recent criticisms of the rules: KoNvrrz, FUXD, NmrAL Lnmrr oF A
FRnE PEOP.z ch. 6 (1957); KoNvrrz, TaE CoNSrrruTnoN AND CxVIL RIGu-rs ch. 3
(1947). See also material collected in EarnnsoN & HABEI, Po-xcA. AND CvIM
Eic-rs iN Tar UN=TE STATES 12 (1952).
127. 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see Carr, Screws v. United States- The Georgia Police
Brutalitj Case, 81 CoRmLL L.Q. 48 (1945); Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal
Protection of Negro Rights, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 94 (1945); Note, 40 ILT L.
Rlv. 263 (1935); Comment, 44 Mcm L. R-v. 814 (1946); Note, 55 YAXt L.J.
576 (1945).




of the public interest may rest on the same side as that of the
petitioner.
(3) The Court must re-establish the preferred position of the
first amendment liberties. Not, I hasten to add, to the extent of
presuming unconstitutional legislation dealing with these freedoms.
But as the Court's own language dictates, as I hope this Article has
developed, and as an excellent historical article demonstrates " -
our forefathers intended and we intend that there be a "Firstness
of the First Amendment." The Supreme Court must discontinue
terminating each statement of the ideals of liberal democracy with
the word "but." Sometime they must begin the next sentence with
"therefore."
(4) The Court must protect liberties for once against the federal
legislature. 175 years of nonuse of the power given the Court raises
question whether power exists. The first amendment directs all its
language to protection of liberties against Congress.
(5) Closely coupled with this last suggestion is the necessity for
the Court to put an end to undue deference to congressional decla-
rations. There is no question but that the legislature should be a
protector of liberties quite as much as the courts, and that the courts
cannot perform the function of the legislature 30 But there is a
court function and it cannot be shirked. The legislature has the duty
of defining the hierarchy of interests requiring protection in the first
instance. Thereafter a court has an obligation to determine whether
that rating is contrary to that fixed by the Constitution and to
determine the reasonableness of the choice. 13 1 The Court has not
hesitated to set aside statutes of state legislators; there is nothing
that changes a legislator or the legislative function when moved
from the state to the federal level. For Mr. Justice Frankfurter to
require only that free voting opportunities be kept open is to rewrite
the first amendment to give remedies within the legislature rather
than remedies against Congress. I find Mr. Justice Frankfurter's own
words as to his duty as a Judge in the Niemotko, the Beauharnais
and finally the recent Sweezy case to require him to change his
view.
2
(6) The rule that if one is enjoying a "privilege" his liberties may
129. Id. at 464.
180. One of the first to point this up was Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of
Transition, 3 PUB. POL. 33-96 (1942).
131. This will be found as fully stated in the self-restraint of Justice Frankfurter
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (concurring), as in the
activism of Justices Douglas and Black.
132. This would seem to be embraced in the Frankfurter views of the duties of a
judge in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (concurring); Beau.




be taken away or curtailed as a condition of that privilege must be
reversed. We may be justified in distinguishing between aliens and
citizens. But we cannot have first and second class citizens. A federal
employee may be subject to some regulations which may not apply
to others, but it is not because he enjoys a "privilege." The cases are
out of line with a substantial body of law.133
(7) Admitted that first amendment freedoms are not absolute,
there are two possible interpretations of this. It may mean that there
are recognized exceptions, but once past the exceptions the protec-
tion is absolute; or it may mean that the interests are only relative
to all others. On this division I have not come to a firm decision,
though I tend to the view of exceptions rather than relativism.134
(8) First amendment liberties were intended to be used by com-
mon citizens. Any definition of the liberties must be in terms under-
standable by those who have occasion to use them. The Court has
condemned statutes which are vague; 1 3 5 it must apply the same test
to itself. It must not devise tests so intricate between inciting, advo-
cating, teaching and like activities that even a Philadelphia lawyer
cannot determine what factors cause "a change of color in the
judicial litmus paper."
(9) The Supreme Court has had its greatest difficulty from 1918
to the present at the point where liberties and violence seem to
meet. I suggest that it needs a deeper analysis of violence and non-
violence and their relation to liberal democracy. In the Dennis and
Yates cases the Court correctly affirms "the basic premise of our
political system-that change is to be brought about by non-violent
constitutional process." No government can assure a "righe' of
violent overthrow -the guaranty and the right are mutually repug-
nant. Jefferson to the contrary notwithstanding, violent revolution
exists outside rather than inside law. Therefore, if the Communist
party is a hardcore agent for a foreign power for violent overthrow,
or if it conspires for violent overthrow, then the violence colors its
acts and they are not protected as first amendment liberties.130 How-
133. E.g., the many cases holding that states cannot require the surrender of
constitutional rights as a condition to the exercise of a privilege: Quaker City Cab
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S.
490 (1927); Note & Comment, 27 MxcI L. REV. 800 (1929); 28 COLUt. L. Rev.
972 (1928); 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 95 (1927).
134. uCmdA, Cwvm i.Lmmxrrs 3N T= Unma-r STATES 2 (1956); Kovrn'z,
FuDAmENTAL. Lm EaTms OF A Faxe FEOPI.E ch. 7 (1957); Mason, The Core of Free
Government: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms", 65 YALE L.J. 597 (1956).
See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 341 U.S. at 524.
135. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S.
95 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1929); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81 (1921); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
136. See distinction and list of cases by Frankfirter, J. in Dennis v. United
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ever, the Court must itself conclude whether the Communist party
is this kind of an act as applied to the particular defendant before
it; it may not surrender its judgment to congressional recitation.
Possibly the Court moves a step in this direction in the recent Yates
and Rowoldt decisions. Furthermore, these liberties being of particu-
lar importance to society as well as the individual in effectuating
the democratic process of truth in the market place, the more that
violent overthrow and incitement to it is condemned, the more must
nonviolent advocacy and even nonviolent resistance be tolerated
and encouraged.
(10) Finally, we must take a new look at the distinction between
beliefs and acts. I believe that the rule which states that the right
to beliefs is absolute but that acts do not carry the first amendment
protections should be dropped. 137 It makes a mockery of beliefs and
suggests that if you are a hypocrite and believe but do not act, you
are protected, but woe is he who carries beliefs into action. It seems
to me that in the Near and Douds cases the Court has itself recog-
nized that fulfillment of beliefs and ideas is as important as the
beliefs themselves.
Nonviolent acts are like words. They are means of persuasion. The
Court treats picketing as free speech. Some statutes condemn acts,
but are themselves methods of thereby persuading or coercing uni-
formity. Free discussion should protect meeting those acts with
acts. If the state compels flag saluting, a man should be protected in
standing with his hands at his side. If a state segregates people in a
bus, people should be able to boycott. Nonviolent acts of persuasion
must be protected if the power to change laws is going to work.188
I began this talk with a quotation from my friend Professor George
Sabine. I end with another, Professor G. Watts Cunningham, for I
believe that if the changes suggested are made, it can be said of
our country:
"Such a society meets the acid test which must be met by any
society which can claim to be democratic. It not only tolerates
dissenters within its borders, including the minority of one cele-
brated by John Stuart Mill, it even looks hopefully to them for
further insight into truth and principles. Only when the implementa-
tion of their opinions and beliefs resorts to force rather than argu-
ment can it be curtailed."
States, 341 U.S. 494, 556-61 (1951) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.) and
American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
137. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Freeman, Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806
(1958).
138. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Tanenhaus, Picketing- Free
Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940 to 1952, 38 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1952); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VA". L. REv. 574
(1951).
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